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Sustainability: a solution to the primary goods and capabilities dilemma 
Can we assess currencies of distributive justice based on whether they are sustainable or not? I 
believe the answer to this question is yes. In this thesis I will discuss that it is possible and 
necessary to assess whether different currencies of distributive justice are sustainable. 
Sustainability as a desideratum of a theory of distributive justice can sometimes help decide what 
currency we should accept. I will argue this applies to the case of two widely discussed currency 
approaches of distributive justice: primary goods1 and capabilities.2 I will refer to them as the 
relevant approaches for the purposes of this thesis.  
Although other currency approaches have been proposed in the literature, these are at the center 
of some important debates on justice. Still, defenders of these alternatives often hit a dead end 
where none singlehandedly ends up being clearly better than the other. In order to solve this 
problem I suggest that sustainability should be used as a criterion for deciding. Thus, I intend to 
answer the question: when considering sustainability as a desideratum of currencies of distributive 
justice, which among the primary goods and capabilities is best? 
Distributive justice focuses on frameworks that provide moral guidance for distributing the 
burdens and benefits of social cooperation.3 These frameworks affect how different outputs are 
distributed within a society. Assessing them entails performing a thorough consideration and 
analysis of many factors. One of these factors is known as the currency or metric of distributive 
justice. This can be defined as that which is to be distributed. It intends to answer the question of 
the distribution of what, or what is to be distributed within society. Primary goods and capabilities 
are answers to this question.  
Assessing matters of currency, as for frameworks of distributive justice, should also consider 
different factors; currencies are part of larger theories4 and thus many elements can influence 
them. Having sustainability as a desideratum of currencies can help with this as it forces us to 
think of multiple factors interacting with each other in order to perpetuate society while 
guaranteeing justice. A sustainable currency will thus be understood as having a good 
performance at least on these aspects.   
Sustainability will be argued to be necessary for theories of justice. It will be defined as the 
potential ability of a system, in this case a society, to sustain itself in a stable and resilient way 
                                                          
1
 The primary goods include rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth as the 
currencies of justice. Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice (Original Edition). Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard 
University Press, 62.  
2
 Capabilities focus on functionings or what people value being or doing as the currency of justice. Sen, A. 
(2001). Development as freedom (Repr.]. ed.). Oxford [etc.]: Oxford University Press, 75. 
3
 Lamont, J. and Favor, C. (2013). Distributive Justice. [online] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available 
at: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-distributive/ [Accessed 20 Feb. 2018]. 
4
 Currencies will be considered as part of a complex system. A complex system has various components that 
interact with each other in an abstract non-logical way. Defintion adapted from: Levin, S., Carpenter, S., 
Godfray, H., Kinzig, A., Loreau, M., Losos, J., . . . Wilcove, D. (2009). The Princeton Guide to Ecology. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
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through time; the concepts of stability and resilience will be discussed in further detail. It is 
necessary to note that, like in justice, some forms of sustainability are preferred over others. That 
one form is preferred should entail at least that it is morally accepted by society. A sustainable 
currency will be defined as a metric of justice that is sensitive to matters of stability and resilience 
in society and can therefore help guarantee this last’s perpetuation. It forces us to make proper 
judgments regarding justice in the long term. Additionally, it helps us take into account non-ideal 
circumstances as it does not assume idealized assumptions of how the world works.  
One aim of this essay is to argue that deciding which currency is best between primary goods and 
capabilities can be done by assessing if they are sustainable. The first premise of the argument 
states that the currency of justice should make us think sustainably, hereafter referred to as being 
sustainable. The second premise I defend is that primary goods fail to be sustainable. The third 
premise holds that capabilities are sustainable. This leads to conclude that the capabilities are a 
better currency of distributive justice than the primary goods as far as sustainability is considered.  
The proposed assessment of primary goods and capabilities will require a sustainability test 
consisting of stability and resilience. In order to do this the argumentation will proceed as follows. 
Chapter 1 will present some basic characteristics of each of the relevant approaches. These will 
consider how they function, some of their strengths and limitations. Before this the concepts of 
distributive justice and its currency will be presented. Why matters of currency should be thought 
of in relation to a variety of factors and in non-ideal circumstances will be discussed. 
Subsequently, chapter 2 will discuss the concept of sustainability and why it should be linked to 
the choice of currency. For the moment this concept can be thought of as a form of social 
sustainability rather than a purely ecological one. The concepts of stability, resilience and the 
notion of a sustainable currency will also be discussed. 
Finally, chapter 3 will perform the sustainability test on the relevant approaches. The three 
possible outcomes that can occur when performing a sustainability test on currencies will be 
presented and explained. One of these will be preferred over the others. The test will require 
assessing whether each approach is stable and resilient. The assessment will result in an 
explanation on why capabilities are a better currency of justice than primary goods when assessed 
in terms of sustainability.  
The general argument will revolve around matters of currency and sustainability. In depth 
discussions on what is justice will be disregarded. Throughout this thesis I will argue that the 
currency of justice should not be assessed in isolation from its environment, that sustainability 
should be linked to the choice of currency, that informational bases play a major role in a currency 
being sustainable, and that by assessing the relevant approaches in terms of a sustainability test it 
is possible to choose one as better than the other. I will consequently suggest that capabilities 
pass the sustainability test while the primary goods do not.  
In general, sustainability is to be taken as a necessary but not sufficient condition for deciding on 
the best currency of distributive justice. As I will argue, for some cases its role as an ultimate 
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decisive criterion on which currency is best will be limited; these cases require additional criteria. 
However, it will be discussed that for the case of the relevant approaches sustainability does act as 
an ultimate decisive criterion. Although under this perspective capabilities are better than the 
primary goods, it is important to clarify also that this is not a claim to the former being the overall 
preferred currency approach of distributive justice. This would require considering in greater 
detail other factors and currencies. This exercise is outside the scope of this thesis. What is 
ultimately intended is to provide a solution to the primary goods and capabilities dilemma of 
which is best as a currency of distributive justice.  
Chapter 1 – An overview of distributive justice, its currency and the relevant approaches 
Primary goods and capabilities are two of the most noticeable currency approaches of distributive 
justice. The former refers to the currency as the things “every rational man would want” (Rawls 
1971, p.62). It mainly includes rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, and income and 
wealth. The latter refers to the functionings that people are able to achieve, or what people value 
being or doing (Sen 2001). There are other currency approaches that are also important, such as 
Dworkin’s equal resources and Cohen’s equal access to advantage. However, I have in part 
decided to focus on the relevant approaches because even though they have been debated in 
great detail, there has so far been no consensus on which is best as a currency approach of 
distributive justice.5 I believe that by introducing the sustainability perspective a new look can be 
given to this tired debate.  
Both approaches have their own strengths and weaknesses. One product of these differences is 
that each seems to have its own discourse and with it its own audience. As Brighouse and Robeyns 
(2010, p.2) notice, although distributive justice and its currency are studied within different 
disciplines, primary goods seem to have been adopted mostly by philosophers while capabilities 
seem to be preferred by economists and policy makers. This is just a generalization, but it says 
much about the general feeling of the debate.  
This chapter provides an overview of this general feeling and what the relevant approaches are 
about. It will sketch their theoretical bases in order to understand them better and assess further 
on how they relate to matters of sustainability. The first section introduces the concepts of 
distributive justice and its currency. The second section dissects the relevant approaches in order 
to compare them in specific matters. It will address mostly characteristics that can be linked to 
matters of sustainability; otherwise this task would extend beyond what is needed.   
Section 1.1 – Distributive justice and its currency 
The main purpose of this section is to explain the concepts of distributive justice and its currency. 
Additionally it seeks to address the importance of the right currency and that a currency should 
also consider its relation to external factors rather than only the internal state of individuals. 
                                                          
5
 For more details and examples on the difficulties of assessing this approaches refer to: Brighouse, H & 
Robeyns, I. (2010). Measuring justice: Primary goods and capabilities. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
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Lastly, it discusses the importance of taking into account non-ideal circumstances for assessing 
matters of currency. 
To paraphrase Lamont and Favor (2013), the general concept of distributive justice can be 
expressed as concerned with the benefits and burdens of economic, political and social matters 
that result from a given moral framework of a society. This means that distributive justice is 
concerned with the entirety of the outcomes that result from the implementation of a given set of 
rules and principles of justice. Lamont and Favor also notice that distributive justice operates 
under the premise that the distribution of benefits and burdens can be influenced by the 
government. Thus, it is a subject central to many issues of public policy.  
A given framework may produce results that are both intentional and non-intentional. Therefore, 
even if an unintended outcome results from the implementation of a given framework, it would be 
fair to attribute it even if for indirect reasons. For example, if framework X produces result A, even 
if A was not desired, and independently on whether it produces a positive or negative outcome, it 
can be attributed to X. In other words, externalities should be taken into account when discussing 
frameworks of distributive justice. Externalities will be understood as the unexpected 
consequences of certain activities (Levin et al 2009).  
Today Rawls’ (1971, p.7) view on the subject of justice is central to many discussions on 
distributive justice. According to him the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society, 
or the way in which institutions deal with matters of distribution of fundamental rights and 
duties.6 Rawls´ view on the subject of justice has been criticized for placing too much weight on 
institutions’ potential for change instead of that of individuals.7 However, this will not interfere 
with us accepting his view of the subject of justice throughout this essay. Nonetheless, this basic 
structure, as will be discussed in upcoming sections, ought to be sustainable in order to guarantee 
justice in the long term.  
Justice frameworks will be understood as particular views on justice and society (Lamont & Favor 
2013). They help define society’s structure by providing the needed moral guidance. The choice of 
a determinate framework of distributive justice over another can have a major impact in the lives 
of its citizens. Different frameworks make possible different forms of society. Due to justice 
frameworks’ potential impact on society it makes sense to understand how they operate and how 
they can be assessed. In order to establish the differences and preference of one framework over 
another discussions on distributive justice consider four major questions. These are:  the shape of 
the distribution, that is, the pattern the distribution is expected to adopt; the scope or dimensions 
                                                          
6
 Institutions should be understood according to Rawls’ definition (1971, p. 55): “a public system of rules, 
which defines offices and positions with their rights and duties, powers, immunities, and the like”. This 
means that institutions act as guidelines in relation to actions that are allowed or prohibited under certain 
contexts. As a result, they can be understood as abstract objects, that is, as behaviors that result from a 
given set of rules, or secondly, as, the conceptual and practical manifestations of individual’s conducts.  
7
 Sen, A. (2010a). The idea of justice. London: Penguin Books. This is not to be confused with Rawls’ view not 
being individualistic. It should be interpreted strictly in relation to the extent to which his theory values the 
social influence of institutions rather than the potential of individuals.  
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considered by the distribution; who is the agent responsible for such a distribution to occur; and 
lastly, the distribution of what, or the currency to be distributed. The fourth question is 
particularly important for the case considered. Primary goods and capabilities, as mentioned, 
intend to answer it.  
Anderson highlights the importance of currencies and helps us classify and understand them. She 
divides matters of distributive justice into two major categories: the metric, also known as the 
currency, and a rule.8  This last can be said to encompass the first three questions of distributive 
justice. These two categories implicitly acknowledge that although other concerns of distributive 
justice are also important, it is the metric or currency which ultimately defines what justice is 
about in the sense that it provides a criterion of measurement. With this I do not suggest that 
currency is the most important of all of the issues related to distributive justice. A single most 
important issue probably does not exist. Nonetheless, it would not be an overstatement to say 
that currency is indeed a major issue within distributive justice. This is in part due to the fact that it 
can allow for an objective metric of the state of affairs in relation to justice (Anderson 2010). 
Assessing justice related issues without it would be nearly impossible since currencies provide a 
reference as to what we should be concerned with.  
Certain currencies fall into a category of what Anderson (2010) calls subjective metrics of justice. 
As its name suggests, these depend on individual appreciations regarding justice. A currency is 
subjective if it does not relate to any objective and constant criteria throughout individuals from 
which to consider matters of justice. Subjective currencies are a problematic type of metric as they 
do not allow for a proper assessment of the state of affairs in terms of justice. This is so because 
comparisons between individual appreciations have no constant point of reference. Subjective 
metrics include matters related to preferences such as whether an individual is happy or likes 
something. Primary goods and capabilities belong to the group of objective metrics since both 
depend on established truths that are considered to be constant across individuals. A guarantee to 
certain human rights can be considered as an objective currency since it is based on a truth that 
can be assessed beyond individual preferences.  
Another differentiation that Anderson (2010) discusses is that of currencies that focus on 
resources or functionings.9 These categories are a subset of the objective metrics. Resources 
consist of goods external to individuals. They include income and legal rights, among others. 
Functionings refer to internal and external factors of individuals, that is, if they are healthy, 
educated, able to socialize, and so on. They are the things a person may value being or doing. 
Functionings can consider resources as a subset. Primary goods are often associated to resources 
while capabilities to functionings. 
                                                          
8
 Anderson, E. (2010). Justifying the capabilities approach to justice in Measuring justice: Primary goods and 
capabilities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P. 81-99. 
9
 It is worth noting that currencies do not only refer to material aspects, but also to intangibles such as 
freedom and opportunity. In this sense having an income can be as important as having access to education. 
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One last differentiation that Anderson (2010) suggests regarding currencies is that between means 
and ends. The former relates to a currency that serves as an intermediate step towards a greater 
goal or another means; it can therefore be, at least to a certain extent, substituted. On the 
contrary, an end-type-currency is not substitutable as it is an end in itself. This last type of 
currency most likely requires the use of resources in order to be attained. As for means, ends are 
not fulfilled by themselves but through the use of resources, whichever they are. Such is the case 
of being able to work as an ends. This requires certain configurations of society as well as certain 
resources like tools and infrastructure in order to guarantee individuals the possibility of working. 
Primary goods are said to be means focused while capabilities ends focused (Anderson 2010).  
With such different forms of currencies and because of their importance it is necessary to have a 
universal way to assess them based on proper criteria. This is necessary in order to decide which is 
best when comparing different ones. A common way to do this is by considering a criterion such as 
egalitarian standards of interpersonal comparison.10 These focus on the conditions on which some 
agents are better off in ways relevant to the justness of a distribution. Though important, this 
criterion poses a problem as it is most likely that any desiderata of an adequate account of 
interpersonal comparison will be subject to objections (Clayton & Williams 1999).  
The reason for this is that many accounts of interpersonal comparison depend on the relative 
importance given to certain aspects, making it to a certain extent a subjective and context related 
criterion. As Clayton & Williams (1999) notice, this is the case when the relevant approaches are 
assessed under this view. Their strengths and weaknesses are relative to the criteria and specific 
context being considered. Thus, capabilities may be better for health issues while both approaches 
may complement each other like in the case of education (Brighouse & Robeyns 2010). Although 
these comparisons are sometimes necessary, being able to do so without relativizing is more 
important as it allows for universal comparisons. Additionally, this type of criterion poses another 
more serious problem: it does not help us to properly take into account aspects worth considering 
to guarantee society’s survival. These aspects include the ability of a given currency to help us 
respond to changes or externalities in order to guarantee society’s existence. 
It cannot be disregarded that any form of justice requires a society on which it can function. Thus, 
before guaranteeing justice it is necessary to guarantee the existence of society. A form of justice 
that affects society negatively in the long term will end up affecting itself; to have justice a society 
must first exist. In other words, a society’s justice framework and its resulting externalities should 
not be self-predatory. An example can help portray this. 
Let us imagine a justice framework whose currency relates to egalitarian standards of 
interpersonal comparison based strictly on capitalist and neoliberal principles. From recent 
experiences one may infer that in the long term a society that adopts these principles will most 
likely be faced with challenges such as a growing scarcity of key non-renewable resources on 
which it depends or with an externality such as climate change. These circumstances may affect 
                                                          
10
 Clayton, M., & Williams, A. (1999). Egalitarian justice and interpersonal comparison. European Journal of 
Political Research, 35(4), 445-464. 
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negatively the consecution of justice because of a lack of the necessary fuel for production of 
goods, for example, or also because of the negative impact of the resulting climate change. In 
other words, they might make it impossible to meet certain societal expectations and therefore 
end up affecting the structure of society which might in turn affect the consecution of justice. Yet, 
these factors might not show up under an egalitarian standard assessment since this would focus 
on improving the internal state of individuals, not on external factors like the long term impact on 
society.  
As it will be discussed in the next chapter, a solution to this problem can be found by looking in the 
direction of sustainability as a desideratum of distributive justice and its currency. Sustainability 
can make us think differently about justice since it seeks to perpetuate society. Thinking 
sustainably does not mean leaving aside the internal state of individuals as a way of assessing 
matters of justice. It means acknowledging that other considerations are also necessary. 
Sustainability helps ensure that a framework’s moral guidance is aligned with the perpetuation of 
society.  
Sustainability was defined as the potential ability of a system, in this case a society, to sustain itself 
in a stable and resilient way through time; it seeks to perpetuate society. In terms of currency 
assessment it is to be understood as an external standard. This means that it can make us think 
about conditions external to individuals when considering what to distribute in terms of justice. By 
doing so it is possible to think on ways in which a society might respond to certain circumstances 
in order to perpetuate society and guarantee justice. When considered as a desideratum of 
distributive justice sustainability can sometimes help assess, at a certain level, which currencies 
are best in a way that egalitarian standards of interpersonal comparison cannot.11 This is the case 
of the relevant approaches.  
In order to assess the relevant approaches in terms of sustainability a clarification is required. This 
assessment will be done by considering non-ideal circumstances. Non-ideal circumstances refer to 
cases where certain idealized assumptions are not met.12 In this context idealized assumptions 
include that actors are willing to comply with a set of desired principles, whichever they may be, 
and that certain favorable social conditions are present. 13 Non-ideal circumstances will be 
preferred over ideal ones for the purposes of the assessment. In this way the analysis will include a 
broader set of circumstances that better reflect the real world. This preference translates into an 
                                                          
11
 Sustainability cannot always help us decide on the best currency. Certain outcomes are possible when 
using it as a criterion for this task. The three possible outcomes will be discussed in chapter 3. One of them 
will be preferred over the others for the case of the relevant approaches.  
12
 Wenar, L. (2017). John Rawls. [online] Plato.stanford.edu. Available at: 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rawls/#IdeNonIdeThe [Accessed 20 Feb. 2018]. 
13
 This is not a discussion on whether ideal circumstances are better or preferred over non-ideal ones. Both 
will be assumed to be important in their own way. Discussions regarding this thesis will focus on non-ideal 
circumstances as sustainability is a demanding issue that does not necessarily comply with idealized 
assumptions. For more on the debate between ideal and non-ideal theory refer to: Valentini, L. (2012). Ideal 
vs. Non‐ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map. Philosophy Compass, 7(9), 654-664. 
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important implication for the currencies being assessed: they should be able to inform us in such a 
way as to make better decisions for non-ideal circumstances.  
An example portrays in general terms the importance of responding properly to non-ideal 
circumstances. Let us imagine a currency that is to be distributed in a given society. It involves the 
use of certain non-renewable physical resources. This is the case of a metric such as access to 
electrical energy. Electrical energy gives people the possibility to live a more just life since it helps 
improve the standard of living, therefore a society might consider necessary to distribute it. This 
most likely requires the use of fossil fuels that cannot be easily replaced in the short term. Initially, 
there is no problem with this currency as everyone can potentially have their just part. However, 
in the long term, under non-ideal circumstances, the population will increase while the non-
renewable physical resources such as fuel on which the currency depends become scarce. As a 
result this currency might become obsolete or affected if no other alternative to produce energy 
exists.  
A currency should be able to make us consider these non-ideal scenarios if the desired goal is a 
particular form of justice. It should make us think in terms of a network system in which 
everything is connected, not only in terms of individuals’ internal states. For this example that 
would mean forcing us to think about alternative resources to guarantee access to electrical 
energy. Yet, in this example, this form of currency as it is does not force us to think properly on 
alternative resources because of its narrow view. A currency that does not make us think properly 
on non-ideal issues might compromise society and therefore justice in the long term.  
Society has been referred to as necessary for justice; however, justice should also be seen as self-
reinforcing. It matters by itself because when it does not work as expected it is very likely that 
things start to fall apart in society as a result of growing inequality and the social and political 
discomfort it produces; this will be discussed further in chapter two.14 Justice helps guarantee the 
existence of society and this reinforces justice.  
A society might be interested in guaranteeing justice but fail to do so if it is poorly informed on 
certain key aspects related to non-ideal circumstances. Societies may face difficulties because of 
the externalities that result from the decisions they make regarding justice. If a society wants to 
avoid such difficulties it needs to consider non-ideal circumstances and its associated factors in the 
long term. In the previous case it would be needed to consider that the scarcity of a resource or a 
lack of alternative may affect the desired form of justice and consequently society, which in turn 
aggravates the possibility of the desired form of justice. 
We will assume that all currencies consider individual’s internal states as this helps us decide on 
the state of justice. Thus, a currency that additionally considers external factors should be 
preferred over one that does not. External factors can be thought of as the product of non-ideal 
                                                          
14
 Newman, J. (2011). Green Ethics and Philosophy An A-to-Z Guide (The SAGE Reference Series on Green 
Society: Toward a Sustainable Future-Series Editor: Paul Robbins). Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications. 
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circumstances that may alter existing circumstances and thus compromise society’s existence or 
the possibility of justice.  
Consider the case of a country at war. War can be seen as an external factor. It will most likely 
affect society in many ways, forcing it to make exceptional decisions in order to guarantee 
survival. This may affect society’s ability to distribute and use a given currency. This is because 
currencies require the use of resources and these last are scarce during times of war. The country 
has two possible ways to deal with such circumstances. One involves a limited frame of action that 
does not take external factors such as war into account. It is possible then that under this view the 
country faces problems adapting to or preventing war conditions.  
On the contrary, the external factor acknowledging view can provide better information on how 
war may affect society or justice and therefore how to respond to it. This is because it might make 
decision makers consider certain non-ideal circumstances. As a result the country might be able to 
deal better with the resulting war conditions. Although it is no safeguard against negative 
consequences, a currency that makes us consider non-ideal circumstances and their associated 
external factors can help us deal with inconveniences that might arise. Not doing so might make 
matters worse. A currency that forces us to think about non-ideal circumstances and external 
factors should be preferred against one that does not. The reason for this is because a currency 
that does so can help us deal better with situations that move away from idealized assumptions. 
This is necessary for a sustainable currency as will be discussed in chapter 2. 
With all this said, the particular interest of this thesis on the currency of distributive justice comes 
from its role as a metric of justice and its potential for making society more just. However, it also 
comes from the fact that the choice of a given currency can have an impact on society’s endurance 
and this in turn on justice. By focusing on matters of currency and sustainability we will examine 
the relation between what is to be distributed within society and what makes this last sustainable 
in the long term. This is ultimately related in the first place to the fundamental or essential things 
of justice like rights and duties that everyone in their condition of individuals who make part of a 
society must have. Secondly, it relates those things to the idea that they should not compromise 
society in the long term; in order for a society to be just it is first necessary that it exists. In order 
to help perpetuate society a currency must help us think about matters beyond individual’s state 
of justice. Not doing so might result in a simplistic view that fails to inform us properly in order to 
respond to society’s changing circumstances and therefore guarantee justice.  
This section has reviewed the concepts of distributive justice, its currency, and explained the 
importance of this last while proposing that it should help us be informed and think about external 
factors and non-ideal circumstances. Sustainability has been proposed as an alternative to 
egalitarian standards of interpersonal comparison for this; it should be a desideratum of 
currencies of distributive justice. It has additionally been stated that the relation between 
currencies and external factors, and the ability of the former to respond to the latter plays an 
important role in matters of justice. This is to be considered if the state of affairs of justice and 
society are to be at least maintained if not improved when ideal conditions are not met. To 
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disregard this fact is to view matters of currency from a simplistic perspective while making society 
vulnerable in non-ideal circumstances. This will be taken into account in order to assess the best 
among the relevant approaches. It will thus be necessary to understand how these two make us 
cope with external factors. In order to do this it is first necessary to look at them in further detail. 
Section 1.2 - An overview of the relevant approaches 
This section will discuss the two relevant approaches by considering their characteristics and how 
each one compares to the other in specific matters. A particular aspect to keep in mind is the 
notion of informational bases. A currency’s informational bases can help us think properly about 
external factors. The concept will be considered in subsequent chapters to assess how each 
approach relates to sustainability.  
Primary goods and capabilities are distinct currencies that tell us what to distribute when 
considering matters of justice. The former was proposed in detail by John Rawls in the early 70s as 
a result of his work on the subject of justice as fairness done during the 50s and 60s. Within Rawls’ 
theory of justice as fairness the answer to the currency question are the primary goods. As said, by 
this Rawls refers to the “things every rational man is presumed to want” (Rawls 1971, p.62). In 
particular, it refers to rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, and income and wealth; the 
most important of these primary goods according to Rawls is self-respect. For the purposes of this 
thesis the conception of primary goods used will be the one laid out by Rawls.  
The capability approach was proposed by Amartya Sen in the late 70s and early 80s. Sen presented 
with it the capabilities as a better metric than the primary goods.15 His main critique targeted 
primary goods’ lack of consideration for individual particularities (Sen 2001, Anderson 2010). In 
other words, primary goods only consider a normal and rational individual while disregarding the 
cases that move away from it.16 This implied that they are ideal in a sense since they assume a 
standard idea of how individuals are. Particularly, they do not consider that individuals are not 
always reasonable and “normal”, whatever motives there may be. Capabilities on the contrary 
take this into consideration because they focus on the alternative combination of functionings that 
are feasible for a person to achieve regardless of their circumstances (Sen 2001). Broad examples 
of capabilities are having the possibility to live a human life of normal length and being able to 
move freely from one place to another. Although capabilities have been subsequently developed 
by Martha Nussbaum,17 its interpretation for this thesis will remain within the conception laid out 
by Sen. A major difference between both is that Nussbaum defends a semi-fixed set of capabilities 
while Sen does not. As a result a fixed list of capabilities will not be considered.   
                                                          
15
 Sen, A. (1980) Equality of What? In: McMurrin S Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Volume 1. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
16
 More on the assumptions of rationality made by Rawls can be found in “The Rationality of the Parties” 
(Rawls 1971, p. 142). Other critiques made by Sen to Rawls’ approach can be found in Sen, 2010a and Sen, 
2010b p. 243.  
17
 Nussbaum, M. (2006). Frontiers of justice: Disability, nationality, species membership (The Tanner lectures 
on human values. 820927694). Cambridge, MA [etc.]: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
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Primary goods belong to Rawls’ theory of justice as it is his proposed currency. In other words, it is 
his proposed metric of justice within his justice framework. The capability approach, although an 
important part of a distributive approach to justice, is not a complete theory of justice in itself. As 
Sen (1990) has stated, it can rather be seen as the foundations of a social theory of justice, not as a 
proper and complete theory itself. However, it does consider many of the same aspects that Rawls 
intended to focus on. Because it considers directly and indirectly these different aspects of a 
proper theory of justice it can be said to resemble one. Capabilities will be addressed as the 
currency of this approach.  
With this made clear, and on a different note, it can be agreed that both relevant approaches’ 
general purpose is to provide the necessary moral guidance for a just society (Brighouse and 
Robeyns 2010). However, they differ as to how to do this in terms of what should be distributed. 
Yet, both seek to provide objective criteria from which to judge whether improvements on 
individuals’ conditions in terms of justice are being made or not (Anderson 2010). We will assume 
that both approaches can potentially help us consider, even if differently, matters related to 
egalitarian standards of interpersonal comparison. However, the real question is whether they can 
additionally make us consider external factors since, as discussed, not taking these into account 
can affect society and justice. Let us then consider each approach’s limits regarding these aspects.  
Primary goods face certain limitations regarding external factors since they are resources and 
focus on means (Anderson 2010). These characteristics, paired up with a differentiation Rawls 
makes within the primary goods, results in some difficulties for evaluating the state of justice 
beyond individuals’ internal states. 18 
Rawls establishes some primary goods as more important than others (1971, p.61). He classifies a 
first group, which includes the basic liberties, as being above those of the second group which 
relate to economic and social gains. Rawls associates the first group to his first principle of justice 
and the second group to his second principle.19 These principles are presented in a lexicographical 
order where one is given priority over the other. The first one, equal liberties, is prioritized over 
the second, the difference principle. As Rawls states it, “the serial ordering of principles expresses 
an underlying preference among social primary goods” (1971, p.63). This entails that although 
primary goods are desired by any individual, some are technically more desired than others. Thus, 
matters of liberty stand out against social and economic goods.  
Since primary goods are resources it should be possible to attain the liberty related goods through 
the second group. That is, they are up to a certain extent substitutable (Anderson 2010). What 
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 Sen also makes a differentiation between capabilities although it is not like the one made by Rawls. Sen 
suggests a distinction between what he calls basic capabilities and the rest. The former relate to the most 
important functionings necessary for survival and for developing other more advanced capabilities. The last 
set includes the other non-basic capabilities. Although the differentiation exists, it does not entail any 
lexicographical preference of one group over the other like Rawls suggests in his approach (Robeyns 2016). 
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 Rawls’ first principle corresponds to that of equal liberty for everyone while the second is the difference 
principle. The first defines and secures the liberties of citizens while the second deals with social and 
economic inequalities (Rawls 1971, p.61). 
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should not be possible is to move away from the equal liberties in favour of social and economic 
advantages (Rawls 1971, p.61). In other words, there is the possibility for some substitutability 
between distinct primary goods since they act as means (resources) rather than ends 
(functionings) (Sen 2001, Anderson 2010).  
From this differentiation Anderson (2010) discusses the limitation of primary goods regarding 
external factors. It is the case when social stigmas and stereotypes are present; these are external 
to individual’s internal states. The example she uses is that of a gay person who has a considerable 
amount of the second group of primary goods, in this case income and wealth. However, no 
matter how rich or his hierarchical position, this individual is still vulnerable to being judged 
externally by a society that does not accept homosexuality.  
It can be argued that Rawls solves this by granting individuals the possibility for self-respect, which 
he considers to be the most important primary good; it is a form of egalitarian standard of 
interpersonal comparison. Yet, as Anderson (2010) argues, this is a subjective metric since it varies 
across individuals. Additionally, it has the same inconvenience as many other egalitarian standards 
of interpersonal comparison: it fails to acknowledge external factors, in this case society’s values. 
As Anderson (2010) points out: “from a public perspective the end of justice is to secure for 
individuals their capability to function as equals in society”. Even if an individual feels subjectively 
self-respected, he might not be an equal in society because of social stigma, a condition external 
to individuals. This translates into a form of injustice even under the assumption of an individual 
who feels self-respect. This example shows that primary goods can fail to help us consider properly 
external factors such as the values of a certain society in order to guarantee justice.  
Capabilities do not account for the same difficulty regarding external factors. This is because, 
unlike primary goods, they help us focus on functionings and ends rather than on resources and 
means. This helps us to also consider external factors rather than only the internal state of 
individuals. Since ends are not substitutable, capabilities can help us think on different ways in 
which they can be fulfilled or affected. Thus, in the previous example, capabilities may help us 
consider external factors such as the societal values necessary in order for someone to be an equal 
in society rather than being limited to individuals’ states such as self-respect, income and wealth 
(Anderson 2010).  
Yet, capabilities do make us face certain difficulties when evaluating justice matters. This limitation 
does not relate to external factors but is still worth discussing. It relates to how capabilities 
prioritize what needs our attention. As Pogge remarks, “the capability approach has not offered 
any criterion of social justice”. 20 This is a strong claim that needs some clarification as it is in a way 
true. It could best be interpreted as capabilities not providing us with a way to prioritize which 
aspects of justice require preferential attention. This is because thinking in terms of capabilities 
gives the same priority to certain matters when it is obvious that they are different. Yet, in reply to 
Pogge, capabilities do offer a criterion of social justice in the sense that they provide an objective 
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 Pogge, T. (2002). Can the Capability Approach be Justified?, Philosophical Topics, 30 (2), 167–228. 
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metric of what matters to justice. Capabilities may fail to provide us with insights to differentiate 
which among access to water and recreational activities should be prioritized, but they do 
consider them as important. Both are capabilities relevant to justice, and although it could be 
argued that water is essential for life and therefore more important, this approach has difficulties 
in helping us acknowledge it. Thus, capabilities cannot be said to provide a clear guideline in order 
to differentiate important aspects from those that are not. Such is the case mentioned for 
recreational activities and water. The result is a lack of priority amongst capabilities, not a lack of a 
criterion of social justice as Pogge suggests.  
Primary goods on the other hand do provide guidelines on the moral importance of inequalities 
thanks to Rawls´ elaborate theory of justice and the differentiations made within the primary 
goods. Through his principles of justice (Rawls, 1971, p.60), the lexicographic order of principles 
(Rawls 1971, p.42), and the differentiation of the two groups of primary goods it is possible for this 
currency to prioritize for most cases within ideal circumstances that conform to his principles, 
what is worth of corrective actions. This however restricts the domain of primary goods mostly to 
ideal circumstances.  
Although capabilities do present difficulties in helping us prioritize what matters need attention in 
terms of justice, they can inform us about external factors and non-ideal circumstances. 
Capabilities have an advantage that primary goods lack and that can be helpful for dealing with 
external factors and non-ideal circumstances. Capabilities, as it will be argued in chapter 3, have 
better informational bases than primary goods; these allow capabilities to help us be informed 
about external factors and non-ideal circumstances and therefore in being sustainable.  
Sen (1980) addresses the question of “equality of what” where he introduces the concept of 
informational bases. These refer to the information that is given the most weight within distinct 
currency approaches. They are necessary to perform evaluative judgements on the state of justice 
from a currency perspective (Sen 2001). Both the information being considered as well as the 
excluded one ends up being important for informational bases. Sen states that the latter 
information should not have any influence when performing evaluative judgements as it is not 
taken into account. Evaluative judgements regarding justice are possible thanks to a currency’s 
informational bases. However, judgement impossibilities are also the product informational bases 
when this last make us think in narrow or limited ways. 
Sen (2001) uses utilitarianism as an example to discuss how informational bases can limit our 
judgements. By drawing upon utilitarianism’s classical form21 and its informational bases he 
discusses that it would be impossible to judge matters of rights, freedom and quality of life. There 
would not be any basis to deliver such an account since classical utilitarianism focuses on pleasure. 
Therefore, the only possibility from a classical utilitarianism perspective would be to make 
judgements related to pleasure.  
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 The classical form of utilitarianism is related to Jeremy Bentham’s view. It is associated to pleasure, 
happiness, satisfaction and the likes.  
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In a similar way as classical utilitarianism, primary goods have limited informational bases 
regarding external factors and non-ideal circumstances. This is best understood with an example. 
As mentioned, primary goods do not take into account the actual functionings of people. In other 
words, primary goods do not consider whether people are actually free and able to achieve what 
they value, they focus on the means (Sen 2001). Primary goods’ informational bases fall short 
when making evaluative judgements regarding ends. The example used by Sen (2001) is that of 
individuals who, having the primary good income, are unable to access certain market goods like 
food because of market inefficiencies such as scarcity. Under scarcity someone who has an 
income, a resource and means, might not necessarily have access to food if the cause of the 
problem relates to market inefficiencies. In such a case an individual might be unable to fulfill the 
end of having access to food and yet have the primary good income.22 This is not the case when 
informational bases focus on the access to certain goods as an end.  
Capabilities, by focusing their informational bases on ends, consider people’s actual functionings 
and their potential to do and be what they value. Capabilities in this sense are not limited to 
individuals’ states. They can consider other factors that can in one way or another affect the 
outcomes of justice. For the previous example capabilities would help us focus on individual’s 
external capacity to access food, not only on aspects such as the income or the means to access it. 
This perspective can potentially allow decision makers to solve this problem beyond 
considerations related exclusively to individuals’ states such as income.  
It is because of differences like these in each currency’s informational bases that the major 
variation between both occurs. This relates to the degree to which the relevant approaches 
consider matters of individual differences (Anderson 2010), an issue mentioned at the beginning 
of this section. Primary goods have been highly criticized on this regard since they fail to take into 
account individual particularities and instead focus only on “normal cases”, also known as ideal 
ones (Brighouse and Robeyns 2010). They only consider a fixed set of resources that normal 
individuals are expected to need in order to achieve their functionings. On the contrary, 
capabilities help us take these individual differences into account as they adapt to each 
individual’s ability to achieve his functionings (Anderson 2010). This includes not only matters of 
individual’s internal context such as disabilities (Nussbaum 2006), but also of their external context 
such as the influence of other agents and factors. In other words, the capabilities’ informational 
bases allow us to take into account variations originating from individuals’ internal states as well 
as from external factors in non-ideal circumstances.  
The notion of informational bases will be important for considering whether these two approaches 
are sustainable or not. A currency with wide informational bases will potentially allow us to make 
good evaluative judgements regarding matters of justice. That a currency has wide informational 
bases also relates to it being stable and resilient, attributes that make up the sustainability test; all 
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 Rawls considers the issue of scarcity by suggesting some normal conditions under which human 
cooperation is possible and necessary (1971, p. 126). However, this is a too demanding ideal circumstance 
that only considers moderate scarcity and that rational long term plans exist (Rawls, 1971, p. 129). In reality 
scarcity can go beyond being moderate and individuals are not always rational. 
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of these will be discussed in chapter 2. Thus, wide informational bases can potentially help a 
currency be sustainable.  
Although discussions between both approaches could continue, they will be left here as the 
necessary topics to look further on to the concept of sustainability have been covered. With what 
has been said the discussion about which approach is best when assessed against sustainability 
can carry on.  
Overall this chapter helped put into context the relevant approaches, why the debate matters, and 
some of its difficulties. It also discussed that matters of currency should not be viewed in isolation, 
related only to individual’s internal states, and exclusively for ideal circumstances. Lastly, it 
discussed that in order to guarantee justice it is first necessary to guarantee society’s 
perpetuation. This implied that the chosen framework of justice should not go against society.  
Some differences, similarities, strengths and weaknesses of the relevant approaches have been 
discussed in this section. It has been suggested that primary goods, contrary to capabilities, have 
certain limitations regarding how their informational bases help us consider external factors. This 
entails that primary goods might fail to help us think about how to perpetuate society and 
therefore justice. It also entails that capabilities might provide us with the necessary information 
to perpetuate society and guarantee justice. However, in order to properly conclude this as true a 
sustainability test will be proposed. This will help us decide whether each currency is sustainable 
or not. In order to do so it is first necessary to discuss in depth the concept of sustainability.  
Chapter 2 – Sustainability 
The previous chapter gave an overview on distributive justice, its currency and the relevant 
approaches. It suggested that currencies should help us consider a series of factors and 
circumstances in order to guarantee society and therefore justice. Lastly, it suggested that 
capabilities are better suited than primary goods for helping us consider non-ideal circumstances 
and their external factors because they do not rely as heavily on idealized assumptions and have 
better informational bases.  
This chapter seeks to explain in detail the conception of sustainability used for the purposes of this 
thesis. Some key concepts will be introduced for this. These include stability and resilience (Levin 
et al. 2009). They are the necessary conditions for assessing currencies of distributive justice in 
terms of sustainability. This chapter will also discuss what a sustainable currency is and why 
currencies should be linked to matters of sustainability. Lastly, some clarifications regarding 
sustainability will be addressed. These clarify sustainability as not being: a purely ecological issue, 
related to matters of intergenerational justice, and a moral side constraint.  
Sustainability is a topic of interest for a variety of disciplines due to its relevance for human 
survival, amongst other reasons. Although its relation with distributive justice is not obvious and 
commonly portrayed, it is an important one (Newman 2011). It makes us consider both, the 
impact of human actions on human societies, and the impact of the external world over human 
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societies. Additionally it helps us understand how different factors interact with one another to 
create long term stability and resilience.  
We have defined sustainability as the potential ability of a system to sustain itself in a stable and 
resilient way through time.23 In this particular case the system can be referred to as society. 
Therefore, we can think of sustainability as societal sustainability. As discussed in chapter 1, using 
sustainability as a criterion to decide which currency is best can help us move beyond commonly 
used but limited forms of assessment like egalitarian standards of interpersonal comparison. 
Not all forms of sustainability are the same. A society might be sustainable but not just. An 
example of this can be found in a coerced society where resources are distributed unevenly. Let us 
imagine that a dictator has coerced his people into being sustainable. In order to do this he has 
distributed some scarce and necessary to live physical resources amongst a small group while 
depriving the majority of the same resources. Due to coercion, rejecting this form of sustainability 
is not possible. This society has adopted a form of sustainability as a result of coercion, not 
because its people wanted. Although it is sustainable, it is not necessarily just as not everyone has 
a fair or equal access to the same necessary resources. This is not the desired form of 
sustainability for assessing matters of currency.  
Instead, sustainability will be understood as being just. A different example is useful to picture 
this. A second society is not coerced into sustainability. Its people have decided to pursue this last 
by their own will. They have freely decided to renounce some liberties, rights and the use of 
certain resources that go against sustainability. The result in this second case is a sustainable 
society product of free will even if it involved renouncing to certain things.  
These two cases portray that not all forms of sustainability are the same and that it should not 
come at any price. This clarification results from the definition proposed by Levin et al. (2009). 
They suggest that sustainability is the ability to be maintained over an extended period of time 
based on current conditions and practices. However, this type of definition seems to disregard 
whether those current conditions and practices are morally justified. Hence it is necessary to 
explicitly clarify that a just form of sustainability is desired. This just form of sustainability can be 
thought of as one that occurs at a societal level rather than as a general all-encompassing form.  
The “ability of a system to sustain itself” within the proposed definition refers to society’s way of 
using inputs and producing the respective outputs in such a way that they do not compromise its 
existence. The reference to time, also in the definition, acknowledges the idea of perpetuity. 
Sustainability could therefore be interpreted also as the ability of a society to endure (Newman, 
2011).  
                                                          
23
 The definition portrayed here for sustainability draws from various sources. It is mostly influenced by 
Levin et al. (2009) although it does not agree fully with it. 
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Diamond24 has suggested that different societies throughout history do not consciously seek to 
come to an end. Instead, the failure to endure ultimately occurs because a society might fail to 
make the right decisions for its perpetuation. The principle that rationality guides society’s 
decisions does not hold in reality as bad and irrational decisions are found to compromise 
different society’s existence throughout history as Diamond (2011) points out. A society that is not 
compromised with guaranteeing its endurance is hard to imagine. Nonetheless, societies that 
strive to perpetuate themselves but nonetheless collapse exist (Diamond 2011); a society that 
collapses will be understood as one that ceases to exist or is unwillingly interrupted.  
A sustainability test is helpful to determine whether a society and its currency are at least 
potentially sustainable. Being sustainable might not guarantee that a society will in fact endure, 
but it certainly helps. This is because sustainability is not an ultimate guarantee against societies 
collapsing, but rather the potential to be prepared to endure.  
The test requires being stable and resilient (Levin et al. 2009). Stability25 prevents societies from 
being easily disrupted by external factors. It means that variations or disruptions of certain factors 
cannot alter considerably the present conditions of society; it is the ability of a system to maintain 
a state of equilibrium (Levin et al. 2009). A state of equilibrium can be thought of as a point where 
a society can manage to keep on existing while being safeguarded against different circumstances 
without necessarily changing its essence.  
Rawls addresses this topic when discussing his theory of justice (1971, p. 456). Similarly, he states 
that well-ordered systems portray equilibrium and stability. However, his use of the concepts 
differs slightly from the ones being considered for the specific case of this thesis. First of all they 
seem to rely heavily on idealized assumptions (Rawls 1971, p. 496). Second, they are expressed in 
a vague way that leaves space for many interpretations (Rawls 1971, p. 457). Therefore, these 
terms will not be considered according to Rawls’ definitions.26 Sen does not seem to address this 
issue directly. The form of sustainability being discussed is non-ideal as it does not rely on 
unrealistically rational individuals or specific social conditions to help guarantee the perpetuation 
of society.  
In a stable society the variation of any factor will not have major disrupting effects on the state of 
equilibrium. This does not mean that change is impossible. What sustainability cannot allow is that 
a disruption, expected or unexpected, compromises society’s existence. Stability relies on a 
systemic view of the relation between different aspects of society in order to guarantee its 
existence. A society is therefore stable if it is not highly susceptible to the impacts of variations 
coming from different factors. It does not matter whether these variations are the result of 
                                                          
24
 Diamond, J. (2011). Collapse : How societies choose to fail or survive (2nd reprinted ed., [with a new 
afterw.]. ed.). London [etc.]: Penguin Books. 
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 The proposed definition of stability and its associated ideas come from Levin et al. (2009). 
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 In general, Rawls’ circumstances of justice, understood as those under which social cooperation is both 
possible and necessary, are too demanding and idealized for the conception of sustainability being 
considered. Let us remember that this last is best conceptualized as non-ideal for the purposes of this thesis.  
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society’s actions or not. Stability ultimately relates to guaranteeing society’s existence by not 
becoming compromised and by being able to endure the impact of a variety factors.  
As an example of stability one can think of a village that depends highly on a given crop X. If a 
plague shows up as a threat to X, the society will be stable depending on whether this 
compromises its existence or not. Therefore, even if X disappears but the village continues to exist 
without major fundamental changes it can be considered stable. On the contrary, if it becomes 
compromised and collapses as the result of the external factors’ impact on X, then it will not be 
stable, and consequently not sustainable.   
Sustainable societies should also be resilient.27 Resilience in this context is the ability of a system 
to recover from or adapt to disturbances or perturbations so that key components and processes 
remain the same (Levin et al. 2009). Being resilient does not require fixed values as to how society 
should be. Nonetheless, safe limits or thresholds without fixed values exist to prevent critical 
transitions that might compromise society. An example of resilience is that of a material that is 
deformed only to return to a form that is very similar to its original one. Resilience in general 
relates to taking into account that not everything is foreseeable and instead random variability 
exists.  
To guarantee resilience for a society, as for stability, it is necessary to rely on a systemic view. 
Being resilient, for our discussion, means accepting the coexistence of persistence and change, 
and being able to adapt. Thus, resilience is linked to the aspects of the past that should be 
preserved, the future conditions which are attainable, which of these are most desirable, and the 
paths to the preferred future conditions (Levin et. al 2009).  
Another example of resilience can be found in how a forest adapts to seasonal changes. The 
elements of a forest adapt to survive change. Some animals hibernate during winter while plants 
lose their leaves. In spring these same animals come back to their habitual activities while plants 
blossom. The variations in seasons do not disrupt the forest’s key components and processes or its 
existence. 
There is a strong relation between stability and resilience as these are two attributes that help 
guarantee sustainability and therefore the endurance of a society (Levin et al. 2009). Thus, they 
will be used to determine whether currencies of distributive justice are sustainable or not. 
However, it is necessary to clarify that being stable and resilient, as for sustainability, does not 
guarantee society’s perpetuation. Nonetheless they do make it more likely. The reason for this, 
again, is because unexpected situations that may collapse society can always occur. However, 
being stable and resilient do help a society to be potentially better prepared, mostly through good 
informational bases, for changes and disruptions even if sometimes a response may not be an 
appropriate one. 
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A society can be stable without being resilient and vice-versa.28 One does not imply the other. A 
society might be unaffected by perturbations in its environment while being unable to adapt to 
changing conditions. Thus, it would be stable but not resilient. Such is the case of a society that is 
not affected by a rise in the price of petroleum but is unable to move beyond its use in time. In a 
similar way a society might be resilient but not stable. It might be affected by perturbations while 
adapting to new conditions. Using the same example, a society might be able to move beyond 
dependence on petroleum while still being highly affected by fluctuations in its price.  
It might be argued that other characteristics of sustainability beyond stability and resilience exist. 
For matters of simplicity the focus will be on these two as they can be thought of as its minimum 
requirements (Levin et al. 2009). By considering only these elements unnecessary ones are 
avoided and thus complications for the assessment are also avoided. The intention with this is to 
keep the assessment of currencies relatively simple by not adding more variables while at the 
same time not oversimplifying it. In this way currencies of distributive justice can be better 
assessed.  
For the case of currencies, stability and resilience allows them to provide us with the necessary 
informational bases to make better evaluative judgements regarding justice and the perpetuation 
of society. This is particularly necessary for non-ideal circumstances since individuals do not always 
comply with the desired principles of justice and favorable social conditions are not always met.  
With this said the conception of a sustainable currency can be discussed. In order to do so it is first 
necessary to explain why the choice of currency should be related to matters of sustainability. 
Sustainability relates the answer of the question of the metric of justice with the condition of not 
compromising society’s existence. Thus, under sustainability matters of currency are not limited to 
the question of what is to be distributed. Instead, it asks what is to be distributed such that it does 
not compromise society’s existence. This is because for a society to remain just in the future it is 
first necessary to keep on existing. Sustainability helps guarantee the existence of society in the 
long term. Being sustainable is therefore desired for a society to be able to be just in the long 
term.  
A sustainable currency is thus one that forces us to consider factors and circumstances that might 
compromise the existence of a given form of a just society in the long term; it is both stable and 
resilient. That a currency is sustainable entails that it helps us through its informational bases, 
which are sensible to matters of stability and resilience, to take into account external factors and 
therefore help guarantee the perpetuation of society. Any sustainable currency must fulfill the 
sustainability test which consists of assessing currencies in terms of making us think in terms of 
stability and resilience, hereafter referred to as being stable and resilient.  
Some last clarifications regarding sustainability are necessary. These include clarifying that 
sustainability is not: a purely ecological issue, related to matters of intergenerational justice, and a 
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moral side constraint. The purpose of this is to avoid misinterpretations regarding the conception 
of sustainability being used. 
Not only are environmental aspects, ecologically speaking, to be considered when referring to 
sustainability as it is often thought. Stability and resilience, and hence sustainability, do not refer 
exclusively to ecological matters. It is also necessary to take into account political, economic, social 
and cultural aspects, among others (Newman 2011). The reason for doing so is because major 
events in any of these spheres can affect and compromise society’s perpetuity. Not doing so will 
result in a shortsighted version of sustainability. A sustainable currency is therefore one whose 
informational bases are not limited to ecological matters.  
References to a society’s environment in this thesis are not restrained to ecological issues. For 
purposes of simplicity the exact limits of the scope of sustainability are not drawn. They should be 
understood as anything that has an impact on human societies, including human actions 
themselves. In this way it is possible to refer to the physical world, including the general notion of 
environment, the human world and cyberspace. This last is also important to consider as it can 
have a direct influence on matters of sustainability and justice. Nonetheless, besides highlighting 
its importance, it will not be the object of further discussions. 
The conception of sustainability being used is both a philosophical and practical one, but it is 
closer to practical matters than to purely abstract and metaphysical ones. Nonetheless, issues like 
values are worth considering as these are important to justice frameworks and the moral guidance 
they provide to society. They can determine whether a society is sustainable or not. Discussions on 
values and their impact on society should be reflected on a currency’s informational bases. A 
sustainable currency should be able to provide the necessary information to reject values that go 
against the perpetuation of society. Examples of these values are those that embrace 
consumerism and material wealth as the drivers of society. As recent history has shown, these 
can, over a period of time, compromise society if they are acknowledged as part of a just system.  
A recent example of this is the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008 which brought economic, social 
and political difficulties worldwide. Its consequences are still felt today. This crisis was in part the 
result of large banks being greedy and prioritizing fast and selfish money over guaranteeing 
customers the security of their investments. Another example regarding values is the one 
portrayed by Anderson (2010) about a gay person in an intolerant society. The associated values in 
this case result in an injustice for this person. This situation, at a large scale, can result in 
intolerance which can in turn result in problems for society such as massive discrimination.  
It is also necessary to mention that the issue of sustainability is not a direct reference to matters of 
intergenerational justice. This last relates to the commitments that present individuals have with 
“potential individuals” of the future (Newman 2011). Intergenerational justice requires us to ask 
certain questions related to general matters of distributive justice. One of these questions is what 
do we owe to those of the future. Although sustainability is linked to thinking about the future 
conditions of society, it does so in such a way that it does not relate directly to such question. For 
this essay sustainability will be confined strictly to the definition that has been proposed. 
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Sustainability will thus be kept within matters related to the perpetuation of society, not with the 
debt of present and future individuals.  
Thus, a sustainable currency should not be understood as being related directly or explicitly to 
matters of intergenerational justice. It should be understood instead as strictly related to a justice 
metric while considering its relation to the perpetuation of society. Both primary goods and 
capabilities can help us discuss matters of intergenerational justice but these aspects will not be 
considered any further than this clarification. 
Lastly, it is necessary to clarify that sustainability as a desideratum for currencies of distributive 
justice should not be given the interpretation of an imposed moral side constraint. This is because 
this can be too strong for what is expected of sustainability for matters of justice. Moral side 
constraints generally act as regulative principles intended to correct those cases when a greater 
goal might result in undesired consequences under certain conditions, although they can also have 
the contrary effect.29 They can be thought of as a way to deal with externalities.  
A common case of a moral side constraint is suggested by Rawls (1971, p.26). He notices that 
utilitarianism focuses on maximizing the overall welfare of society, or in other words, on the 
aggregate social good even if this entails performing actions against certain individuals. To prevent 
this last, a moral side constraint for utilitarianism would state that although the goal is to 
maximize welfare, this should not allow any action against individuals in the name of the common 
good.  
The reason for this clarification in the context of sustainability is because as a side constraint it can 
be too demanding on distributive justice. Justice cannot be delivered sustainably all the time. One 
major reason for this is that sometimes the needed information to guarantee stability and 
resilience is not available. Thus, placing sustainability as a moral side constraint for a currency may 
become a burden if the necessary information in order to be sustainable is impossible to obtain.  
In other words, a currency might intrinsically force us to think in terms of stability and resilience, 
but the needed information might not be at hand at a given moment. This is best portrayed with 
an example.  
Imagine the case of a justice framework that faces a circumstance X and uses a currency A that is, 
in theory, sustainable. Although currency A might fulfill the sustainability test, for circumstance X 
the needed information regarding matters of stability and resilience might not be available. This 
does not mean that A should not be used. Instead, this situation should be interpreted as a 
particular circumstance where A cannot provide us with the necessary guidance in terms of justice 
and sustainability. It should not lead us to conclude that A is an unsustainable currency.  
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As portrayed in the previous example, and because sustainability is very difficult to attain in 
practice, the requisite of sustainability will instead be considered as a desideratum of currencies of 
distributive justice rather than a moral side constraint. The reason for doing this is because it 
might be a possibility that justice will sometimes need to be prioritized over matters of 
sustainability. Such a case might be one where a given health care system must be abolished due 
to it not being financially sustainable, yet, the necessary information or resources to build a new 
one are not available. Thus, abolishing the current system at once might not be the best choice if 
not alternative exists, even if the current one is unsustainable in the long term.  
For this case, by framing sustainability as a desideratum rather than a moral side constraint it is 
possible to prioritize matters of justice against short term sustainability without necessarily losing 
sight of the long term. For this case that would mean allowing the health care system to exist until 
a solution is at hand. In this way both sustainability and justice can be attained without necessarily 
being confined to choosing one over the other as this might end up being worst. Having to choose 
sustainability over justice might actually end up compromising society because of the potentially 
resulting political turmoil due to the abolishment of the health system. A middle point is a better 
solution. For this particular case sustainability is desired, but not imposed.  
Such cases as the previous one portray that a sustainable currency can face limits for some non-
ideal circumstances where perfect information or immediate sustainable solutions are not at 
hand. However, even in these situations a currency that is sustainable but has its limits ought to be 
preferred in the long term over one that is not sustainable. The reason for this is because the 
former at least has the potential to force us to make better decisions regarding justice and 
sustainability in the long term, but do to the circumstances it is not possible to do so. That under 
certain non-ideal circumstances a given currency might fail to provide us with the needed 
information does not mean that it is not sustainable. It is best if it does, but it is not a necessary 
condition as it would if sustainability were a moral side constraint.  
With these clarifications some other topics regarding sustainability have been discussed to avoid 
misinterpretations. This section has discussed the notions of sustainability, stability, resilience, 
sustainable currency, and why sustainability should be linked to matters of currency. Additionally, 
it has intended to clarify specific aspects related to sustainability that might lend themselves to 
misinterpretations. It is now possible to discuss the details of the sustainability test regarding the 
relevant approaches.  
 
Chapter 3 – Assessing the relevant approaches 
This chapter will focus on assessing the relevant approaches in regards to the sustainability test. 
The test consists on assessing whether currencies meet the conditions of stability and resilience. 
These two attributes were presented as essential for sustainability (Levin et al. 2009). The first 
section will present the three possible cases that might occur as a result of using sustainability to 
assess currencies of distributive justice. One of these is preferred over the others for its simplicity 
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and because it reflects the case of the relevant approaches. This case states that one currency 
should be preferred over the other in terms of sustainability as one is sustainable and the other is 
not.  
The actual assessment will be done in the second section. This exercise will justify that capabilities 
are a better currency of distributive justice than the primary goods in terms of sustainability. The 
assessment will analyze and explain whether each individual approach has the ability to be stable 
and resilient.  
The third section will discuss the assessment’s results. It will provide explanations of the 
implications that one approach is sustainable and the other is not. It will also present and negate a 
counterargument to the primary goods not being sustainable. A broader set of conclusions 
regarding this entire thesis and its main argument will be discussed later in the conclusions.  
3.1 Three possible outcomes 
There are three different possible outcomes when using sustainability as a criterion of assessment 
to decide on the best currency approach. These three cases consider whether two or more 
currency approaches are being assessed. Hence, they will be expressed in a general form, not 
specifically for the case of the relevant approaches. I will defend that the last case, where one 
approach is sustainable and the others are not, applies to the relevant approaches.  
It is important to notice that sustainability as a desideratum of the currencies of distributive justice 
should be understood as a necessary but not sufficient condition for assessing currencies. This is 
because sustainability, although important, has its limitations as a criterion for this purpose. Even 
though it can help set apart those currencies that are sustainable from those that are not, it 
cannot guarantee as a criterion to help decide for all cases which currency is best. Therefore, 
sustainability should not be seen as the ultimate criterion of assessment as some cases (outcomes 
1 & 2 of this section) will require further considerations. This is because sometimes when 
assessing the sustainability of currencies there is no guarantee that one is the best.  
Consider the case of three currency approaches that are being assessed under the sustainability 
criteria. Two of them are sustainable while the other one is not. From this we can only deduce that 
the latter one cannot be the best approach if sustainability is desired. We cannot conclude from 
the sustainability test anything else regarding which of the other two is best since both are 
sustainable. Therefore, the use of sustainability as a decisive criterion can be said to be limited for 
this case. Although sustainability acts as a first filter, it cannot provide us with an answer. 
Additional criteria would be necessary to assess the remaining two sustainable currencies. This will 
not be the case for the relevant approaches as I will argue that capabilities are sustainable while 
primary goods are not.  
The three general possible outcomes of the sustainability test are: 
1.  No sustainable approaches: this is the case where none of the two or more currencies under 
consideration fulfill the sustainability test and therefore none of them are suitable as the best one 
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in terms of sustainability. It would only be possible to choose one as the best approach if the 
sustainability desideratum is left aside and a different criterion is used. However, this last would 
defeat the purpose of using sustainability as a criterion to choose the best currency approach. This 
particular case can be interpreted as a minimax30 one since this is the worst possible scenario 
where no alternative is sustainable but still one approach is to be chosen as the metric of justice. 
In other words, the least bad alternative, an unsustainable one, can still be chosen as the best 
assuming that additional criteria can be used to assess the different currencies beyond matters of 
sustainability.  
2. Two or more approaches are sustainable: this occurs when two or more of the approaches 
being considered are sustainable. Similar to the previous case, it is necessary here to assess the 
sustainable alternatives based on additional criteria in order to choose one as the best. This is so 
because when there are two or more sustainable alternatives, a decision on which of them is the 
best based purely on sustainability becomes impossible. For the relevant approaches these first 
two outcomes are not worth considering as they do not apply to their case. The result of the 
assessment of the relevant approaches falls under the third possible case.  
3. One sustainable approach: This is the case where one of the approaches being considered is 
sustainable while the others are not. This scenario leaves aside all those approaches that are not 
sustainable. At the same time it validates the one that does, even if it does not meet other 
additional requirements.31 This is the case of the primary goods and capabilities since the latter is 
sustainable and the former is not.  
The following section will show that the first two cases should be discarded given that capabilities 
are sustainable while primary goods are not.  
Section 3.2 – The assessment 
This section will explain why capabilities can help us think in stable and resilient ways while 
primary goods cannot; this will be the outcome of the sustainability test. In general, the reasons 
for this result are because capabilities have wide informational bases that help us focus on ends 
rather than means (Anderson 2010) and therefore take into account aspects such as external 
factors (Sen 2001). On the contrary, primary goods have well defined but limited informational 
bases and do not properly take into account external factors. Let us examine these characteristics 
and their relation to stability and resilience to understand why. Stability will be discussed first and 
resilience afterwards.  
                                                          
30
 Minimax is a decision criterion used to minimize possible losses when faced with the worst possible 
scenario. For currencies the worst possible loss would be, given the fact that none of them are sustainable, 
not to be able to choose one as the best or to choose a bad currency. Thus, in order to prevent this result an 
additional criterion could possibly be added to choose one approach as the best amongst the options even if 
none of them is sustainable.  
31
 The desideratum of a currency being sustainable should be taken in a lexicographical way. This means that 
sustainability, if not first in priority, should at least be somewhere near the top. The reason for this is that 
any moral framework that is not sustainable may compromise society.  
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In chapter 2 we have stated that stability requires maintaining a state of equilibrium even when 
faced against perturbations (Levin et al. 2009). Let us remember that the state of equilibrium is 
the point where a society can manage to keep on existing while being safeguarded against 
different circumstances without necessarily changing its essence. A stable currency is thus one 
that can make us think how to prevent and overcome major perturbations that can compromise 
society.  
Perturbations can be the product of different factors. In order for a currency to remain unaffected 
by them it is necessary to identify them in the first place. Only by doing so it is then possible to 
deal with them or perform preventive actions against them. This means that a currency should 
make us think about them in order to be able to be considered stable. In other words, a currency’s 
informational bases should help us produce better judgements on how a society’s stability may be 
affected and maintained.  Taking into account potential perturbations or the factors that may 
produce them allows a currency to potentially make us think about how to be able to guarantee 
the desired state of equilibrium to help perpetuate society.  
In realistic terms it is very unlikely that all factors can be taken into account by any currency’s 
informational bases. However, this does not mean that certain currencies cannot do better than 
others in this matter or, most important, that which interests us, that they cannot be stable at all.  
For a currency to be stable it is not necessary to consider all possible factors as this would be 
unrealistic. This would require dealing with a too demanding level of complexity. We will not 
assume or demand that a currency’s informational bases can help us take into account all the 
possible factors that might affect the state of equilibrium. Instead we will work with more realistic 
assumptions.  
By having informational bases that consider a basic set of factors a currency should be able to 
provide us with sufficient insights to perform good although not perfect evaluative judgements 
regarding stability. Good evaluative judgements can translate into necessary decisions and actions 
for maintaining stability. A currency that allows us to be sufficiently well informed regarding these 
matters has the potential to help us produce the minimum necessary judgements for stability.32  
At this point a clarification is needed. A currency could be said to have wider and better 
informational bases than another. However, this does not actually say anything about whether 
they are stable or not. It refers only to their relative position regarding their informational bases. 
For the case being considered not only do capabilities have better informational bases than 
primary goods. Capabilities’ informational bases allow them to be stable by helping us think in 
terms of maintaining the state of equilibrium in order to perpetuate society. The opposite happens 
with primary goods.  
Capabilities’ informational bases can help us think in terms of stability. On one hand they can 
make us think in terms of justice as they are a currency of distributive justice focused on 
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 I will avoid defining what it means to be sufficiently well informed. The reason for this is because each 
circumstance is particular and requires unique considerations.   
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functionings. On the other they can help us consider the necessary factors that might alter the 
state of equilibrium of society and thus help us make decisions to be able to cope with them. As 
mentioned, this is mainly the product of this approach being ends focused rather than means 
focused. By focusing on ends capabilities can make us think on the factors that might prevent a 
given justice goal from being accomplished. It can therefore force us to be prepared to deal with 
factors that might disrupt society as this might in turn affect justice negatively.  
By focusing on whether a given end is being met or not capabilities can provide us with good 
information that translates into good evaluative judgements. Its ends-focused informational bases 
consider the means necessary for directly fulfilling justice goals while indirectly considering the 
perpetuation of society. This contributes to stability since it can help us think in terms of the 
desired state of equilibrium by helping us consider both the internal state of individuals and 
external factors.  
Focusing on ends also allows capabilities to include in its informational bases both what the actual 
functionings are and the resources necessary to maintain them; functionings were defined as the 
things a person may value being or doing (Sen 2001). This also provides us with a broad spectrum 
of information from which to draw an ample set of evaluative judgements.  
In the food and income example we saw that capabilities can help us determine whether people 
have a just access to food beyond matters of income. Its informational bases were not limited to 
the internal state of individuals. They also helped us consider external factors. Similarly, for the 
case of a discriminated gay person when being equal in the eyes of society is a requirement of 
justice (Anderson 2010), capabilities could help us take into account a set of factors, such as the 
values of society, which might prevent the required equality from occurring. This is, again, because 
capabilities focus on ends. For this last example capabilities can help us consider a broad set of 
information which includes factors internal and external to individuals. This can help us guarantee 
equality by considering individuals’ internal states and the societal factors that might affect those 
same individuals.  
Focusing on means, like primary goods do, requires a narrower set of informational bases 
restricted mostly to matters of resources; this makes it difficult to consider a basic set of factors 
that might alter the state of equilibrium. This results in primary goods not being stable. It is in part 
the result of this currency not considering ends.  
Primary goods’ informational bases, which result from a means focused perspective, do not 
necessarily guarantee that the ends are being met (Anderson 2010).  If ends are not taken into 
account it becomes difficult to make evaluative judgements on whether the goal is being achieved 
or not. Well informed evaluative judgements in terms of stability are therefore unlikely for primary 
goods because ends and their potential disruptors are not taken into account. This is the result of 
some important information not being included in primary goods’ informational bases.  
By not having some key information available it is hard for primary goods to help us produce the 
necessary evaluative judgements to maintain the state of equilibrium. Let us remember that the 
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information excluded from informational bases cannot be reflected in the respective evaluative 
judgements (Sen 2001). If ends are not considered the associated factors that might affect them 
are not considered either.  
In other words, since primary goods are means focused their informational bases do not include or 
help properly guarantee ends. As a result they cannot help us produce the necessary evaluative 
judgements regarding ends and how certain factors, mostly external, may affect these ends. Thus, 
primary goods as a metric of justice present difficulties in helping us think beyond resource related 
matters and individual’s internal states. As a consequence, certain factors can go undetected by 
our judgements. This can affect society’s stability and therefore also justice.  
This is the case of using income as a means to solve the needs of people like in the mentioned case 
of food scarcity. For this case, rather than a lack of income, the problem can be attributed to 
external causes like inefficient allocation of resources in the market. Yet, evaluative judgements 
regarding aspects like these are highly unlikely through primary goods due to their nature. 
Another example could be the case of focusing on an individual’s self-respect (Anderson 2010), an 
internal factor, when in reality the causes can be found outside him. Such is the case of the gay 
person in an intolerant society who is affected by discriminating values.  
Disregarded external factors can have a negative impact on the stability of society with a primary 
goods approach. An example can be found in the specific case of a public policy that seeks to 
guarantee good health. Primary goods will focus its informational bases on the resources 
necessary for this to occur. This may not help us evaluate properly external factors; this is in part 
the result of not focusing on whether the end of having good health is met. A primary goods based 
policy might focus on the institutional framework for the goal of good health to happen rather 
than on whether there is actually good health. This approach would guarantee people the rights, 
liberties, powers, opportunities, income and wealth for good health. Yet, it might fail to make us 
take into consideration disruptive external factors. This is because there is no information on 
which to deliver an evaluative judgement regarding such external factors that might affect the end 
of good health.  
A disease might be easily propagated if the necessary measures to prevent it are not considered, 
even if the right institutional framework is in place. A complimentary policy to guarantee good 
health that monitors foreign diseases from expanding locally would be a good solution to this. 
However, it is nowhere to be found within primary goods’ informational bases since it is resource 
rather than ends focused. Not doing so might seriously end up affecting society’s stability both 
because of the damage the disease can do to the general population and because of the social 
discomfort that might result from the poor institutional preventive measures.  
Primary goods’ informational bases might include resources such as income to spend on health, 
having doctors, hospitals and medicines. However, these means focused informational bases leave 
outside external factors that might prevent the goal of good health from occurring. They only 
consider matters related to the state of individuals and whether they have the mentioned 
resources or not.  
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Let us think about how preventive measures might fit within primary goods. Preventive measures 
are desired as they can help society cope with external factors that might affect the goal of good 
health from being fulfilled.  It could be argued that a primary goods defender might not be against 
such measures. However, this is a different question. One thing is to support preventive measures 
and the other, the one that concerns us, is whether primary goods as a metric or currency of 
justice can help us think about them. It is hard to see how primary goods can help us consider 
preventive measures if ends are not being taken into account. Preventive measures hardly fit 
within the primary goods rights, liberties, powers, opportunities, income and wealth. These are 
mostly limited to individuals’ internal states and do not consider external factors.   
The case is different when ends are considered like when using capabilities. This would require 
considering not only the necessary resources as for the case of primary goods. The different 
external factors that might affect negatively the goal of good health are also among the things to 
consider.  
An example of an external factor to take into account because it can affect the goal of good health 
is the consumption of sugar products. This would be within the informational bases of capabilities 
because of its potential negative effect on the end of good health. Thus, this approach would be 
able to make preventive evaluative judgements of the impact of sugar products on good health 
and be prepared for potential problems. This is because capabilities seek to guarantee the end, 
not the means.  
The means grounded informational bases of primary goods will most likely not take this into 
account. It is possible to say that someone has the necessary primary goods for good health. This 
would imply saying that an individual is recognized with the right to good health, has the liberty, 
power and opportunities to have good health, and possesses the necessary income and wealth to 
guarantee it. Yet, this does not help us answer whether the actual goal is being achieved. It in no 
way helps that same individual consider how an external factor might disrupt his possibility for 
good health. His state of equilibrium regarding good health may not be maintained because of a 
limited view on what is necessary to do so. Primary goods, for this example, cannot be said to be 
stable since they cannot make us think properly on how to prevent and overcome major 
perturbations that can compromise the goal of good health.  
As discussed, failing to guarantee good health can end up affecting society and therefore justice 
because of the political turmoil and instability it might bring (Levin et al. 2009). Such inability from 
primary goods to guarantee an end is not exclusive to good health; it applies to general cases 
because of its characteristics as a metric of justice. 
On the contrary, capabilities can help us think how to maintain the state of equilibrium in society. 
For the sugar example, this last could be by preventing a widespread of diabetes within the 
population; this could be done by a preventive public policy that compliments resources such as 
primary goods. The impact of sugar products would be considered not only in relation to how it 
affects good health strictly in terms of justice, but also for the perpetuation of society as this last 
helps guarantee the former. The state of equilibrium produced by capabilities entails that even the 
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influence of external factors such as sugar will be unlikely to produce a considerable negative 
impact on good health and therefore on the stability of society.  
As in the previous example, capabilities can in general help us be prepared to deal with external 
factors as a result of their wide informational bases which focus on ends. Capabilities cannot only 
be referred to as having better informational bases than the primary goods. They can also be said 
to be stable since they can help us produce the required state of equilibrium. The same cannot be 
said of the primary goods since their informational bases do not help us take into consideration 
external factors, therefore potentially affecting the state of equilibrium and failing to guarantee 
the stability of society.  
Second to stability we need to assess both approaches in terms of resilience. Resilience requires 
that key components and processes of society remain the same while adapting to change (Levin et 
al. 2009). A resilient currency was referred to as one that can make us think on ways to adapt to 
change without causing major disruptions that may compromise society. This adaptation to 
change should be grounded on the aspects of society that should be preserved, the future 
conditions that are attainable, which of these are most desirable, and lastly, the pathways to those 
preferred future conditions (Levin et al. 2009); these are the questions of resilience. In order for a 
currency to be resilient it is necessary that it helps us answer or at least think about these 
questions.  
Resilience therefore requires for currencies to make us think in terms of appropriate informational 
bases in order to answer its questions; a sustainable currency’s informational bases should be 
both stable and resilient. While stability relates more to responses against perturbations or 
external factors, resilience is a form of subtle adaptation. Resilient informational bases differ from 
stable ones because the former do not focus on making us think on how to be safeguarded against 
external factors, although this matters until a certain extent. Instead, that a currency’s 
informational bases are resilient means they can help us think in terms of flexibility to guarantee 
just societal arrangements that do not compromise society; this is done by answering the 
resilience questions.  
Just societal arrangements refer to the way a society is structured in terms of justice. A just 
societal arrangement, besides being just, must help perpetuate society in order to guarantee 
justice. A given arrangement is the result of thinking in terms of a particular justice framework. As 
a stable currency helps us consider external factors that might affect society, a resilient one should 
make us think about different societal arrangements in order to help us guarantee the 
perpetuation of society and justice.  
Thus, a resilient currency will make us consider different possible societal arrangements in order 
to choose the one that best helps us answer the questions of resilience. In order to do this a 
resilient currency must have appropriate informational bases. In this way a resilient currency can 
help us think about ways to guarantee justice and the perpetuation of society.  
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My claim is that capabilities are resilient while the primary goods are not. Capabilities can make us 
think in terms of the resilience questions and just societal arrangements. This can help a society 
adapt to change while guaranteeing justice and without causing major disruptions that may 
compromise it. By being ends focused capabilities allow us to compare different social 
arrangements in order to answer the resilience questions. Capabilities help us think on whether a 
given end is met or not through different possible societal arrangements and thus allow us to 
consider different answers for the questions of resilience. They allow us to make the necessary 
evaluative judgements in terms of justice and resilience in order to help society endure.  
The reason for this is because capabilities as a metric of justice allow us to think in terms of a 
comparative approach of justice. This is what Sen (2010b) refers to as the ranking of alternative 
social arrangements. By doing so, capabilities can help us think in terms of the different 
alternatives as to how a given end can be accomplished. In this way it is possible to address the 
questions of resilience and to take into consideration different social arrangements while 
considering not only the internal state of individuals but also external factors.    
The same good health example discussed for stability is useful to clarify this. It has been discussed 
that if the end is to guarantee good health, capabilities, through their informational bases, can 
help us address the necessary matters to guarantee it in terms of stability and the state of 
equilibrium. Capabilities can also help us think these matters in terms of resilience. They can help 
us address the questions of resilience by helping us think in terms of the desired social 
arrangement in order to guarantee good health. Additionally, they can help us compare different 
possible social arrangements in order to choose what is desired, what is not, and how to do it in 
order to guarantee the desired end of good health.  
Thus, capabilities might help us decide that for a specific society a given social arrangement might 
not be possible. For the health case it might be that privately owned health companies go against 
the end of good health as these might end up benefiting privates rather than society as a whole. 
Instead, for this society another social arrangement like state owned companies might be 
preferred. Reaching this conclusion or any other would be possible as the result of capabilities 
allowing us to compare different social arrangements in order to guarantee the end of good 
health.  
Capabilities will not only make us think on the best societal arrangement, but also on how to get 
there. Having to guarantee a given end, capabilities can help us think in terms of what is feasible 
and what is not for the compared just societal arrangements since they can help us consider 
external factors. Rather than just considering the internal state of individuals, capabilities can 
additionally make us think about a variety of external factors that can help us guarantee a given 
end. Thus, if the best social arrangement to guarantee good health would be to have publicly 
owned health companies, capabilities can make us think in terms of what is desired and what is 
not, at a societal level, in order for this model to work. In other words, they can make us think in 
terms of the questions of resilience in order to guarantee a given end for society.  
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On the contrary, primary goods do not make us think properly about ways to adapt to a just 
societal arrangement while helping us guarantee the perpetuation of society. They might help us 
consider alternatives such as private or publicly owned companies. However, they do not help us 
answer properly the questions of resilience and are therefore not resilient.  
The reason for this can be traced to what Rawls refers to as the principle of efficiency (Rawls 1971, 
p. 67). This relates to how primary goods ought to operate.33 As Rawls’ answer to the metric 
question, primary goods are indirectly intended to assess the state of affairs of justice in relation 
to whether everyone is better off. To do this, Rawls states that primary goods should be 
distributed in an efficient way. Inefficiency occurs if there are ways for some individuals to do 
better without doing any worse for others. This poses two major problems if the questions of 
resilience are to be answered. Both relate to the limited informational bases resulting from the 
principle of efficiency.  
The first of these relates to primary goods considering a social arrangement based on the internal 
state of individuals. As discussed, primary goods can help us decide how to make everyone better 
off according to individual’s internal states. However, they fail to properly acknowledge external 
factors and their potential impact on justice and society since ends are not properly taken into 
account. Distributing within society more of the primary goods might not be a good alternative if 
this implies compromising society in the long term. More liberties or income, to mention a few 
primary goods, might not be the best solution to society’s justice problems. Some external factors 
associated to the societal arrangement should also be considered. This is something that might 
not show up when using primary goods as a metric of justice because the questions of resilience 
are not properly addressed from this perspective.  
Primary goods cannot help us think adequately about the societal arrangements that do not 
contribute to society’s long term existence and the ones that do. Its informational bases are 
mostly focused on whether someone is better off without making anyone worst off in terms of 
resources (Anderson 2010). Thus, primary goods may not be able to help us decide whether 
certain societal arrangements are better than others while encompassing both the internal state 
of individuals and external factors. Because of their characteristics they focus mostly on 
individuals’ internal states.  
Primary goods are not able to help us generate proper evaluative judgements in terms of 
resilience regarding good health. It is possible that a primary goods defender might argue that 
through primary goods we can also compare different just societal arrangements such as the 
private and publicly owned system. Assuming this was true, it would still be the case that this 
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 In strict terms this goes beyond the specific question of the metric of justice and touches that of its 
distribution. Nonetheless, this is something that needs to be taken into account within Rawls’ conception of 
primary goods being discussed. Although it could be argued that it is possible to conceive primary goods 
without Rawls’ principle of efficiency, let us remember that we are assessing his particular conception of 
primary goods and therefore we will assume them to be structured in such a way. We will therefore assume 
the principle of efficiency to be inherent to the conception of primary gods being assessed.  
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comparison might leave aside external factors and focus only on individuals’ internal states; this 
being the result of its limited informational bases that focus on means rather than ends.  
The second problem associated to primary goods in terms of resilience and the principle of 
efficiency is that they do not allow us to properly consider the possibility of removing certain 
benefits to some individuals as this would mean making them worst off. Let us remember that 
resilience requires of us to think what are the things in society that we desire and which ones we 
should discard (Levin et al. 2009). This entails the possibility of removing certain arrangements 
that might compromise society.  
For the case of good health this would mean removing some individuals’ access to a private health 
system in order to make a better public one. A public health system might not be the best 
alternative for everyone, but this is the wrong thing to focus on. Instead, we should focus on 
whether the public health system would be able to deliver the minimum requirements of a decent 
health system to everyone, contrary to the private one which benefits only some. In this way it is 
possible to argue that, even though some might be worst off as they no longer have access to a 
private health system, they would still receive the minimum requirements of a decent health 
system that would be beneficial to all; this would not be an injustice since a minimum is 
guaranteed at a societal level. This would help those who are unable to access the private system 
while still delivering good health to the ones who can. Not doing so might create imbalances that 
might end up affecting society in the long term.  
The principle of efficiency seems to be too strong and inflexible of a demand on a metric of justice 
for the purpose of resilience. For the case of primary goods this limits the possibility to discard 
aspects of a social arrangement because it might imply removing benefits to some individuals; this 
is not possible as primary goods operate under the basis of not making anyone worst off. In some 
cases such as the one portrayed, flexibility might be valued over efficiency as conceived by Rawls’ 
primary goods. Thus, primary goods might fail to be resilient as a result of having this limitations in 
the way in which they make us think in terms of justice.  
A currency of justice, by being resilient, should help us discard those aspects of a social 
arrangement that may not contribute to society’s endurance and therefore to it being just in the 
long term. This is only possible if, as in capabilities, we can think about informational bases in 
terms of ends rather than means without any restrictions on the configurations of the just societal 
arrangement. By doing so it is possible to keep track properly on whether the actual ends are 
being met, and therefore it is indirectly possible to properly manage the different social 
arrangements. For the case of primary goods this is not possible as it might involve changing the 
just societal arrangement in such a way that some are made worst off, even if this still entails that 
justice is being delivered.  
Therefore, primary goods cannot be said to be resilient as they do not allow us to think properly 
and answer the questions of resilience. The contrary occurs with capabilities as their informational 
bases and ends focus allow us to think adequately in terms of the necessary changes and just 
societal arrangements to perpetuate society and justice.  
35 
 
It can then be concluded that capabilities have better informational bases, in terms of stability and 
resilience than the primary goods. Most importantly, it can be stated that capabilities are both 
stable and resilient, and therefore sustainable, while primary goods are not. A main reason for this 
is because capabilities are ends focused and help us consider external factors while primary goods 
are means focused and do not help us consider properly external factors. Additionally, capabilities 
allow us to compare without restrictions different societal arrangements while primary goods do 
not due to the limitations imposed by the principle of efficiency.  
As discussed, this outcome is the third possible case when sustainability is used as an assessment 
criterion for currencies of distributive justice. This was the case where one currency is sustainable 
while the rest are not. This is exactly the result found when assessing the relevant approaches 
under the lens of sustainability. One approach is sustainable while the other is not. This leads us to 
conclude that the sustainable one, capabilities, should be preferred over the other, primary goods. 
Section 3.3 – Assessment conclusions 
The purpose of this section is to expose some of the major conclusions of the assessment of the 
relevant approaches. Additionally, a possible argument in defense of the primary goods as a 
sustainable currency will be discussed and rejected.  
It has been argued in the past section that, as currencies of justice, capabilities can be both stable 
and resilient while the primary goods cannot. This makes the former sustainable but not the latter 
according to the proposed sustainability test. A major reason for this is that capabilities are ends 
focused. This allows this approach to provide us with a wide set of informational bases that can 
make us think in terms of stability and resilience. Capabilities help us think how to prevent and 
overcome major disruptions that can compromise society. In other words, capabilities can help us 
think in terms of stability. Similarly, they can make us think about ways to adapt to change without 
causing major disruptions that may compromise society; this corresponds to capabilities being 
resilient. Its informational bases can help us compare different societal arrangements to answer 
the questions of resilience. These two characteristics contribute to it being sustainable. 
This does not imply that capabilities, because of being sustainable, are a safeguard against a 
possible collapse of society. They do not encompass every possible factor or alternative social 
arrangement as to perfectly guarantee society’s perpetuation. It does make us consider however a 
minimum set of considerations in order for such a task to be more likely.   
The primary goods on the contrary have a narrower set of informational bases. This is mostly the 
result of this approach being means focused. Its informational bases are not good enough for it to 
be sustainable as they do not consider properly end related factors or different societal 
arrangements. They cannot help us consider properly external factors in order to guarantee 
stability. Additionally, its efficiency principle limits the ways to address different societal 
arrangements. These characteristics end up affecting primary goods’ potential for making us think 
in terms of sustainability. Although they are a good objective metric of justice, they fall short on 
aspects that were discussed as necessary for any currency of distributive justice that seeks to 
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make us think in terms of sustainability. As a currency primary goods are not totally aligned with 
guaranteeing both justice and society’s perpetuation.  
A primary goods defender can argue that this currency is indeed sustainable on the grounds that 
Rawls considers concepts such as the circumstances of justice (1971, p.126) and the just savings 
principle (1971, p. 285). The first of these refer, according to Rawls, to the normal conditions in 
which human cooperation is possible and necessary. These circumstances do relate in a way to 
sustainability as Rawls considers moderate scarcity in order to cover a wide range of situations. He 
also considers that individuals have rational long term plans. The problem with these two aspects 
is that they do not seem to be the right ones if non-ideal circumstances are to be taken into 
account by a currency of justice. Scarcity is not always moderate and rationality cannot always be 
assumed. The circumstances of justice portrayed by Rawls are idealizations that are not always 
met. This can present problems for a currency if it cannot help us consider non-ideal 
circumstances and their associated external factors. The circumstances of justice are an idealized 
portrayal of the conditions in which justice can occur; they are not aligned with our conception of 
sustainability as non-ideal. 
Regarding the just savings principle there is also an inconvenient in terms of sustainability. This 
principle is conceived in relation to matters of intergenerational justice but fails to consider the 
sustainability of society. In other words, it seeks to guarantee a minimum of justice across 
generations of individuals but fails to consider the endurance of society as a whole. Thus, it can in 
theory help a currency to make us evaluate the minimum requirements of justice between 
different generations of individuals, but this minimum might fail to consider whether it somehow 
affects society in the long term. The issue of intergenerational justice was discussed in chapter 2.  
Because of these reasons, and because these two aspects seem to belong to Rawls’ general theory 
of justice than to the specifics of primary goods as a currency of justice,  primary goods cannot be 
said to be sustainable even if Rawls somehow considers certain ideas related to sustainability.  
The social sustainability discussed in this thesis cannot be attained through primary goods as it can 
through capabilities. The former presents us with a too idealized view that fails to consider 
external factors properly; it cannot make us think in terms of stability and resilience. The latter 
currency does help us think in terms of the endurance of society by making us consider external 
factors; it helps us think in terms of stability and resilience.  
Conclusions 
The general argumentation of this thesis has revolved around matters of the currency of 
distributive justice and sustainability. It has been argued that capabilities are better than the 
primary goods when assessed in terms of sustainability. For this it was necessary to discuss that 
matters of currency should not be viewed in isolation, but rather as part of a complex system. It 
was also discussed that justice should not compromise society. Sustainability was suggested as a 
way for currencies to do this. Therefore, it was used to assess distinct currencies. 
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This way of assessing currencies was defended for the case of the relevant approaches as they fell 
in the third possible outcome when using sustainability as an assessment criterion for currencies. 
In order to have reached these conclusions it was necessary to understand properly what 
sustainability was and its relation to distributive justice. Sustainability stood out not only as an 
important matter that needs attention in our contemporary world, but also as an attribute 
necessary for metrics of justice. A currency that is sustainable would be preferred over those that 
are not. This is because it is not only necessary for a currency to focus on matters of justice, but to 
do so in a way as to guarantee society’s perpetuity in order to be able to deliver justice in the long 
term.  
Sustainability was framed as a desideratum of justice, not as a moral side constraint. This was 
because placing it in the category of a side constraint would have been too demanding for matters 
of distributive justice. It was referred to as a necessary but not sufficient requirement for assessing 
matters of distributive justice. The reason for this last was because, even though it is a useful 
criterion of assessment of currencies, sustainability would not always act as a criterion for 
choosing the best currency. 
The concepts of stability and resilience were presented as the minimum requirements for 
sustainability. Thus, they were used for the sustainability test in order to assess currencies of 
distributive justice. The result of this exercise for the relevant approaches was that capabilities are 
stable and resilient, thus also sustainable. Primary goods are not stable and resilient, and 
therefore not sustainable. This led to conclude that capabilities are a better currency than the 
primary goods when sustainability is considered. A major reason for this is because of their 
informational bases. Capabilities’ informational bases are ends rather than means focused and can 
help us focus on non-ideal circumstances and their resulting external factors. This allows 
capabilities to make us think in terms of a broad set of realistic circumstances that help guarantee 
society and justice.  
The role of informational bases as key factors in currency matters stands out as these are 
important in order to guarantee sustainability. A currency that does not have the proper 
informational bases cannot be considered sustainable as it would most likely fail to be stable and 
resilient.  
Further work on matters of sustainability and currency might involve discussions related to: the 
role substitutability plays within distinct currencies and how this affects sustainability, how 
capabilities’ problem in prioritizing important justice related matters affects sustainability, and 
last, until what extent can and should currencies help us cope with highly unlikely and improbable 
events known as black swans.   
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